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3. Abstract 
The rapid internationalisation of the Spanish property market has triggered debates about 
the main characteristics of emerging post-crisis urban dynamics. Financial and urban policy 
reforms have shaped a model depicted by incessant rent increases and displacements. 
Echoing these concerns, this article addresses two interconnected objectives about the way 
policy restructuring encouraged transnational investments into Spanish real estate and the 
concomitant socio-spatial effects this wider asset reshuffling has produced. Both queries are 
discussed by pinpointing the multi-scalar investment strategies of the private equity firm 
Blackstone that emerged as predominant institutional investor during the recovery phase of 
the Spanish property market. The article initially sketches out the trajectory of the political 
economy of housing in Spain, and then it focuses on the strategies pursued by Blackstone 
for the acquisition of real estate and housing stock. The following sections connect the 
nodes of the financial chain that link this investor to former social housing tenants whose 
homes are by now owned by Blackstone. The spatial and social effects of this change in 
property ownership demonstrate the importance of in-depth research about the financial 
nodes that interplay with and shape the post-crisis urban condition in and beyond Southern 
Europe. 
Tracing the socio-spatial logics of transnational real estate investment: 
Blackstone in Madrid. 
 
 
1. The transnationalisation of real estate investment in Spain  ? An introduction. 
Ten years after the global financial crisis there is a growing consensus that the finan-
cialisation of real estate markets remains crucial for the creation and uneven distri-
bution of wealth (Aalbers & Haila, 2018; Marcuse & Madden, 2016; Rogers, Nelson & 
Wong, 2018). The economic and political shockwaves of the crisis have triggered 
novel debt-management policies and institutional arrangements resulting in an ex-
tensive rescaling of the State. The ongoing restructuring of housing into a liquid, 
commodified and globalised asset epitomises how financialisation has been shaping 
the socio-spatial logics in cities across Europe (Fields & Hodkinson, 2018; Alexandri & 
Janoschka, 2018). In other words, the fresh cycle of accumulation reinforces the en-
larged role of novel financial tools and institutions, whereas investment strategies of 
global financial actors increasingly influence the living conditions of urban popula-
tions (Gotham, 2009; Waldron, 2018). This is especially true in Spain, which along-
side with the US and Ireland was hit the hardest during the crisis yet has now be-
come the epicentre of real estate investment for transnational institutional actors 
who have poured billions of euros of internationally mobile capital into the country 
(Beswick et al., 2016; Byrne, 2015; Di Feliciantonio & Aalbers, 2018). 
The rampant restructuring and transnationalisation of the Spanish property market 
offers a prime research gap with potentially inspiring insights for academic but also 
political debates taking place elsewhere in Europe. For instance, social movements 
have identified so-caůůĞĚ ‘transnational landlords ?ĂƐŬĞǇĚƌŝǀĞƌƐŽĨƌŝƐŝŶŐƌĞŶƚƐfaced 
by millions of households across the country. Paired with displacement pressures 
stemming from the proliferation of tourist accommodation in central areas, this has 
now seriously affected the affordability of housing in many Spanish cities (Cócola 
Gant, 2016; Hughes, 2018; Janoschka, 2018). However, existing research has mainly 
concentrated on other aspects of the Spanish housing crisis, such as the biopolitics of 
mortgage and the socio-spatial effects produced by repossessions (Garcia-Lamarca & 
Kaika, 2016, Garcia-Lamarca 2017; Gutiérrez & Vives-Miró, 2018). This means that 
only limited knowledge exists about the political strategies to attract transnational 
investment into the Spanish post-crisis housing market. And so far research has not 
addressed how this has actually affected housing circumstances in specific places 
and neighbourhoods. While it has been widely discussed how uneven processes of 
financial accumulation distress the living conditions of tenants and mortgaged 
homeowners in the US, the UK and Germany (Aalbers, 2016; Beswick et al., 2016; 
Fields & Uffer, 2016), the consequences of the transnationalisation of housing mar-
kets in Spain still remain underexplored. 
Taking into consideration these initial reflections, the article aims at providing ana-
lytical insights into two mutually related questions, namely (i) how policy restructur-
ing encouraged transnational investment into Spanish real estate during the post-
crisis period and (ii) which socio-spatial effects this wider asset restructuring may 
produce. Both queries will be discussed by pinpointing the multi-scalar investment 
strategies of the private equity firm Blackstone, which emerged as predominant in-
stitutional investor during the recovery phase of the Spanish property market.  
Our argumentation will be developed in four steps. The first section will draw con-
ceptual enquiries into the processes and essence of housing financialisation. In a 
second step, the political economy of the Spanish housing market and its recent re-
structuring will be analysed. This will elucidate the specific political and economic 
arrangements settled to attract transnational investors, as well as reconstruct Black-
stone ?s investment strategy in the country. Thirdly, institutional changes will then be 
linked to the daily experiences of Blackstone tenants in the working-class district 
Carabanchel in the south-western periphery of Madrid  W an area that was subject to 
the sale of 1,860 public housing units to Fidere ?ŽŶĞŽĨůĂĐŬƐƚŽŶĞ ?ƐůŽĐĂůďƌĂŶĐŚĞƐ. 
This analysis prepares a final discussion connecting the socio-spatial logics of finan-
cial actors conceptually with reflections about the role that low-income residents 
play in housing markets under the conditions of contemporary capitalism. While the 
presence of transnational investors intensifies gentrification and touristification in 
Madrid´s central areas by causing further rent increases, empirical findings in the 
periphery of the city suggest different structural adjustments paving the way to yet 
another housing crisis by triggering multiple displacements. 
The analysis stems from qualitative empirical research carried out during more than 
two years in Madrid. We have created a matrix systematising and triangulating data 
from sources such as financial and real estate journalism, related online information 
on the websites of Blackstone and its subsidiaries, the asset management company 
SAREB1 which was established during the bank bailouts in 2012, the National Stock 
Exchange in Madrid and the Orbis business data base. This contextualises the recon-
struction of Blackstone ?Ɛ and other institutional investors ?ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ in Spain. More-
over, in-depth analysis was also informed by two focus groups and semi-structured 
expert interviews with representatives of local government institutions such as 
elected councillors, professional assessors, and chief executives of the Municipal 
Housing Corporation. Finally, household research included in situ observation, partic-
ipation in neighbourhood assemblies, and the conduction of three focus groups with 
housing activists and twenty in-depth interviews with households in properties 
owned by Fidere. 
 
                                                          
1 SAREB is the asset management company that took over so-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘ƚŽǆŝĐ ? ĂƐƐĞƚƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ŶŽŶ-
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵŝŶŐůŽĂŶƐ ?ƌĞƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞĚŚŽƵƐŝŶŐ ?ŐĂƌĂŐĞƐĂŶĚůĂŶĚĨƌŽŵ^ƉĂŶŝƐŚƐĂǀŝŶŐƐďĂŶŬƐ ?ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?
bank rescue. The abbreviation corresponds to its Spanish name, which is: Sociedad de Gestión de 
Activos procedentes de la Reestructuración Bancaria. 
2. Housing financialisation and the transnationalisation of real estate  
The notion of financialisation refers to the growing importance that finance has 
gained in contemporary societies, especially with regard to political or economic 
governance. Debt is the principal mechanism of financialisation, and this is either 
reflected in the form of specific contracts such as loans, bonds and mortgages or by 
the proliferation of financial tools like securities or derivatives. The most dominant 
approaches to financialisation understand this process as taking place in three dif-
ferent domains:  
(i) On the aggregate economic level, as a new regime of accumulation that is 
based on finance, with investment shifting from the spheres of production 
and manufacturing to finance because of the expectation of higher capital 
returns (Krippner, 2005; Lapavitsas, 2014); 
(ii) On the corporate level, with the generalisation of the principle of maximi-
sation of shareholder value for corporate governance (Boyer, 2005; Lazon-
ick & Sullivan, 2000);  
(iii) On the individual level, as the financialisation of everyday life conceptualis-
ing the citizen as an investor able to contract into the consumer logic of 
credit and debt by accessing  ‘democratised financial markets ? (Martin, 
2002; Pollard, 2013).  
Recent research has addressed how financialisation unfolds in cities, offering nu-
anced understandings on new forms of uneven development (Hendrikse and Sida-
way, 2014; Sokol, 2017). Financialisation may be grasped in the way the flows of cap-
ital in and through space change the perception of land and real estate from being 
productive and socially reproductive towards being a purely financial asset (Harvey, 
1982). ĐĞŶƚƌĂůŐƵŝĚŝŶŐĨŝŐƵƌĞŝŶƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐŚŝĨƚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞ ‘ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ
ĨŝŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?Marazzi, 2011; Mezzadra and Neilson, 2015) is exactly mirrored by this ten-
dency. It includes the creation and release of value through debt financing, which is 
materialised by the prioritisation of exchange values, and most importantly in the 
abstraction oĨ ‘ŶĞǁůǇĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚ ?ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞǀĂůƵĞƐŽƵƚŽĨĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐƵƐĞǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ŚƌŝƐ ?
tophers, 2010).  
The politics of housing financialisation have become crucial for understanding recent 
urban transformations. Prior to the crisis, the expansion of loans and mortgages in-
tensified capital circulation through personal debt (Garcia-Lamarca & Kaika, 2016). 
This was supported by policies targeting securitisation, assuming that splitting com-
modities into securities enhances the exchange value of the mortgage and enables 
banks to support economic growth with more liquidity. However, mortgage securiti-
sation also transformed the logics of capital accumulation by converting illiquid as-
sets into liquid and exchangeable products. Hence, public and private actors could 
better finance property development, eliminating spatial and temporal barriers to 
the realisation of exchange values out of real estate assets (Gotham, 2009). This 
method triggered substantial increases in mortgage liquidity and growth of second-
ary mortgage markets where securities were exchanged and sold, often based on the 
assumption of an infinite rise of housing prices (Wyly et al, 2009). Moreover, housing 
policies guided the decisions of households either directly, by promoting homeown-
ership, or indirectly by dismantling laws protecting tenants. With the expansion of 
the financialisation rationale, states became increasingly interested in promoting 
mortgaged homeownership to keep financial markets and the aggregate economy 
growing (Aalbers, 2016). But this cycle came to a halt when property prices started 
to fall during the global financial crisis. 
Consequently, the economic reverberations of the crisis triggered novel policy 
mechanisms addressing housing. A plethora of studies demonstrated how policies 
targeting the financial sector have triggered the recovery of housing markets (Aal-
bers, 2016; Beswick at al., 2016; Dymski, 2016). For instance, research about mort-
gage and housing crises in the US, Ireland and Spain has similarly addressed how the 
recent restructuring of the sector is shaping additional rounds of financialisation, 
with mortgaged defaulting properties being first nationalised and then again repri-
vatized and sold to international investors (Byrne, 2015; Fields, 2017; Méndez & Pla-
za, 2016; Palomera, 2014; Sabaté, 2016; Waldron, 2018). According to Fernandez 
and Aalbers (2016) housing acts in the post-crisis scenario as a recipient and absorb-
ĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ǁĂůůŽĨŵŽŶĞǇ ?ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚďǇƚŚĞgeneralisation of loose monetary policies, 
the expansion of financial operations and growing surpluses of pension funds and 
institutional investors. By seeking investment opportunities with high yields and fast 
returns, these investors transform the acquired property stock into profitable assets, 
especially in the rental market. This process is often accompanied by rent increases, 
which may cause the subsequent displacement of lifelong residents (Fields, 2017). 
Transnational investors also assume halted urban regeneration projects through 
public-private partnerships that further generalise urban entrepreneurialism and 
gentrification. Subsequently, the entrance of transnational investors signifies a cru-
cial qualitative transformation in the city, entangling housing with finance to create 
new enclosures (Hodkinson, 2012; Beswick et al., 2016).  
In order to better grasp the complex socio-spatial restructuring that attaches every 
single place to the abstract world of finance, we subsequently consider the notion of 
 ‘financial chains ? as a useful analytical tool (Sokol, 2017). By identifying the effects of 
finance for daily lives, this concept refers to the channels of value transfer between 
people, places and institutions while relying on credit and debt. As stated by Sokol 
(2013), the value transfer from the debtor to the creditor actually reproduces social 
and spatial inequalities in cities. This means that debt has become a chief mecha-
nism of income redistribution that intensifies the mechanisms of economic exploita-
tion (Lazzarato, 2012). The notion of the financial chain has the potential to explore 
beyond the ways actors are connected to each other through financial means, yet 
including also the way they are literally chained to each other in unequal social and 
spatial relations (Sokol, 2017: 679). As the new uses and exchange values driven by 
the financial imperative of profit are establishing themselves upon pre-existing social 
and spatial relations, this may essentially link to the notion of creative destruction 
(Schumpeter, 1942). By focusing on financial chains, the subsequent discussion will 
connect the global sphere of real estate and finance with people´s lived experiences. 
More precisely, by offering an empirical exercise to this theoretical framework and 
drawing our attention to the processes of housing restructuring and financialisation 
in Spain, we reconstruct and visualise the financial chains that connect the transna-
tional investor Blackstone with the inhabitants of DĂĚƌŝĚ ?Ɛ Carabanchel neighbour-
hood as an example of urban change driven by real estate transnational investment. 
 
3. The political economy of housing in Spain: Post-crisis restructuring, transnation-
alisation and the rise of the Blackstone empire 
Housing financialisation is not a standardised process that follows concrete forms or 
norms; it is influenced by specific legal, political and social contexts; hence in each 
case it is as different as the political economies of housing (Fernandez & Aalbers, 
2016). From this perspective, it is crucial to recall some key characteristics defining 
the political economy of housing in Spain. In policy cycles, the promotion of home-
ownership was a long-term and twofold strategic mechanism pursued since the late 
1950s, aiming simultaneously at boosting effective demand and settling property as 
an extractive means (Coq Huelva, 2013; López & Rodríguez, 2011). Subsequently, tax 
breaks and other incentives for consumers on one side and direct subsidies to devel-
opers on the other side allowed especially working-class households to buy proper-
ties below the market price (García Pérez & Janoschka, 2016). Since the mid-1990s 
new financial policies and legislation boosted the scope of mortgaged homeowner-
ship (for more detailed analysis see Alexandri & Janoschka, 2018; Garcia Lamarca & 
Kaika 2016). Moreover, urban rent laws eventually removed rent controls and ten-
ĂŶƚƐ ? ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ (Palomera, 2014). As a result, supply-oriented policies supporting 
homeownership triggered an over-exposure of the Spanish economy to the con-
struction sector yet motivating a widespread normalisation of homeownership 
across most social strata, peaking at about 85 percent in 2007 (Janoschka, 2015).   
In the aftermath of the economic crisis, non-performing loans (NPL) emerged as a 
fundamental problem  Wfor individuals whose mortgages had been securitised2, for 
construction companies and land developers that went bankrupt, but also for local 
and national politics W affecting the aggregate economy. Rising NPL rates triggered 
intense liquidity problems to the banking sector, with regional savings banks at the 
edge of collapse. The subsequent rescues were managed by the Fund for Orderly 
Bank Restructuring FROB3, which is the government agency supervising since 2009 
the restructuring processes of the Spanish banking sector. However, in June 2012, 
the FROB dried up, steering the Spanish government to subscribe to a 9 ? ďŝůůŝŽŶ  ?
rescue credit programme granted by the European Union (EU), the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the sanitisation of the 
                                                          
2 According to the Spanish mortgage association, the gross provisions of mortgage credit between 
2000 and 2006 amounted to 1,166 billion euros, while the aggregate of mortgage securities reached 
214.2 billion euros, equivalent to 18.4 % of all mortgages (Martín, 2013). 
3 This is an abbreviation for the Spanish name  ?Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada BĂŶĐĂƌŝĂ ? ? 
ďĂŶŬƐ ? ƉŽƌƚĨŽůŝŽƐ. Since then, bank mergers accelerated, and a set of technocratic 
ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐǁĞƌĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚƚŽŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞƚŚĞĐůĞĂƌŝŶŐƵƉŽĨ ‘ƚŽǆŝĐ ?ƌĞĂůĞƐƚĂƚĞĂƐƐĞƚƐ
(Alexandri & Janoschka, 2018). This restructuring allowed transnational investors to 
permeate the Spanish real estate market.  
One key instrument was the establishment of the asset management company 
SAREB to secure the long-term economic strategy of financial and real estate recov-
ery. This  ‘bad bank ? was designed to absorb NPL portfolios, repossessed housing, 
land and other assets to later place them back to the real estate market. The titanic 
size of this task transformed the SAREB at least temporarily into one of the most 
important real estate actors in Europe (García Pérez & Janoschka, 2016). Moreover, 
it performed the ƌŽůĞŽĨĂ  ‘ŵĂƌŬĞƚŵĂŬĞƌ ?, generating an institutional environment 
that encourages and directly negotiates real estate transactions and investments, 
preparing the ground for new rounds of accumulation through the housing market 
(Alexandri & Janoschka, 2018). The SAREB has been widely selling and outsourcing 
the management of NPLs and repossessed houses to transnational investors, for in-
stance under newly structured assets named as FAB4. These are funds comprised of 
assets and liabilities transferred from the SAREB under advantageous tax rules to 
private equity companies. Under the scheme the SAREB groups assets, for instance 
by its nature, credit condition or geographical location, to facilitate  ‘disinvestments ?. 
For example, in 2016 the SAREB sold the FAB Corona comprised of office spaces in 
Madrid to Blackstone and the FAB Crossover consisting of land with building permits 
in Madrid, Catalonia and Valencia to Neinor Homes (participated by Lone Star 
Funds). Other FABs such as May, Teide and Bull were sold to the equity firms For-
tress and HIG Capital. 
Additionally, three more policies and schemes addressed the profound re-
articulation of the Spanish real estate market, easing transactions between banks, 
public administrations and transnational investors: 
1. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs5), which were granted zero corporate 
taxation if they focus on rental properties.  
2. The debt management companies called  ‘ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƌƐ ? constituting of ventures 
between bank subsidiaries and private equity funds, managing the value re-
covery from NPL and the corresponding properties. 
3. The amendment of the Urban Rent Law focusing on de-regulating the rental 
sector to improve its attractiveness for institutional investors. 
The purpose of REITs is the purchase, promotion and rehabilitation of urban assets 
(i.e., flats, offices, commercial premises and shopping centres, logistics) either for 
rent or as a participation in the capital of another REIT. They act as the node that 
                                                          
4 dŚŝƐŝƐĂŶĂďďƌĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞ^ƉĂŶŝƐŚŶĂŵĞ ?Fondo de Activos BĂŶĐĂƌŝŽƐ ?. 
5 Real estate investment trusts (REITs) are financial entities that invest in real estate through property 
or mortgages. Habitually traded on stock exchanges, they receive special tax considerations and offer 
high yields. In Spanish language, REITs are named Socimis as abbreviation ŽĨ P “Sociedades Anónimas 
Cotizadas de Inversión Inmobiliaria ? ?
links transnational investors with local real estate markets, generating networks and 
knowledge exchange about the condition of real estate and identifying in many cases 
hidden rent gaps (Gotham 2009; Waldron 2018). REITs were established in Spain in 
2009 (Law 11/2009), and the legislative framework was amended by the Law 
16/2012, allowing more flexibility and establishing a zero corporate tax rate. Accord-
ing to this reform, REITs should allow at least 80% of the value of their assets for 
leasing. However, the novel framework allows them to opt for special fiscal regime 
and benefit from tax advantages even if they do not meet these requirements provi-
sionally. The number of REITs listed at the National Stock Exchange in Spain expand-
ed from 3 to 58 in only five years, and it has been estimated that REITs are control-
ling now approximately half of all residential and 80 percent of commercial property 
market transactions (CBRE, 2017). In 2018, the SAREB inaugurated its own REIT 
called Témpore Properties, placing a portfolio of nearly 1,400 rental homes in Madrid 
and Barcelona valued at 175 million  ?.  
The so-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘servicers ? constitute ventures of bank subsidiaries with institutional 
funds that manage the process of recovering value from NPL and the real estate that 
backs them. Offering a flexible scheme of direct management of NPL and mortgaged 
properties, the assets managed by servicers have ĞǆƉĂŶĚĞĚƚŽ  ? ? ? ? ?ďŝůůŝŽŶ  ?  ?ǆŝƐ 
Corporate, 2016). This market has strongly attracted transnational institutional in-
vestors. It is considered as a segment with high yields, especially since economic re-
covery gradually transforms non-performing into re-performing loans. For instance, 
in December 2014 the SAREB finalised the Proyecto Ibero, which allocated the man-
ĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƌĞƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞĚŚŽƵƐĞƐĂŶĚŵŽƌƚŐĂŐĞƐŽĨĂǀĂůƵĞŽĨŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ ? ?ďŝůůŝŽŶ ?
to the four servicers Solvia (belonging to Sabadell Bank), Altamira Asset Management 
(belonging to Apollo Global Management), Servihabitat (belonging to Texas Pacific 
Group Capital), and Haya Real Estate (belonging to Cerberus Capital Management). 
This transaction delivered the management of 126,300 assets for seven years to 
transnational investors and was by then the largest single internationalisation that 
had ever taken place in the Spanish real estate market. However, there were more 
than 40 other transactions of this kind over the last five years transferring assets to 
different management companies. 
Parallel to this financial and real estate restructuring the amendment of the Urban 
Rent Law in 2013 focused on making rental properties more flexible and attractive, 
by removing rent controls ĂŶĚ ƚĞŶĂŶƚƐ ? ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ. Amongst others, the amended 
Law lowered the duration of contracts to three years (from five years set earlier), 
after which the owner may adjust rents discretionary or terminate the contract. 
Moreover, it permitted the imposition of rent increases of up to 20% in case of re-
pairs and improvements at any time, and it eliminated the pre-emption purchase 
right for the tenant, which has allowed the direct sale of flats and entire buildings to 
institutional investors. 
Blackstone and the creation of a real estate empire in Spain 
In only five years since 2013, the private equity firm Blackstone has literally created a 
real estate empire in Spain, consisting of more than 120,000 assets that include 
rental flats, mortgages, offices, hotels, and land ready for real estate development. 
tŝƚŚ ĂŶ ŽǀĞƌĂůů ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ĂďŽƵƚ  ? ? ďŝůůŝŽŶ  ? ? ůĂĐkstone has now become the 
most important single actor in the Spanish real estate market, surpassing the value 
of assets managed by the SAREB. However, this rapid expansion occurred rather si-
lently through a nested strategy of subsidiaries and was phased as follows:  
Step 1  ? a polemic market entry. ůĂĐŬƐƚŽŶĞ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŽ^ƉĂŶŝƐŚƌĞĂůĞƐ ?
tate is related to a highly polemic privatisation initiative carried out in 2013 by two 
Madrid based public companies liable to the local and regional governments: the 
Municipal Company for Housing and Land (EMVS6) and the Institute for Housing of 
Madrid (IVIMA7). At the height of the economic crisis and just after the 2012 bank 
rescue programme, both institutions launched tenders to sell 4,795 social housing 
units plus the corresponding garages and storage facilities to private investors, 
benefiting Goldman Sachs (under its local subsidiary Azora) and Blackstone (Fidere) 
with respectively 2,935 and 1,860 housing units. Arguing over the need to reduce 
costs, minimise deficits and rescue public budgets from assets that allegedly pro-
duce financial burdens, this action provoked strong public opposition. The tenders 
were criticised by the supervising institutions as opaque, irregular, badly docu-
mented and economically unnecessary (Cámara de Cuentas de la Comunidad de 
Madrid, 2016). Legal causes have been ruling out the illegality of the divestment, 
and they have been accordingly scrutinised to be treated at European courts. How-
ever, this privatisation of social housing implicated the launch of ůĂĐŬƐƚŽŶĞ ?ƐƌĞĂů
estate investment under the brand Fidere, which was later listed at the National 
Stock Exchange as the REIT Fidere Patrimonio SOCIMI SAU. The REIT managed its 
operative business initially through three sub-companies, expanding its structure 
by 2017 to eleven sub-REITs. On the other hand, it belongs to the Spanish Residen-
tial REIT HOLDCO SARL, which is in turn owned by Blackstone Real Estate Europe IV 
LP and Blackstone Real Estate Europe VII LP, direct subsidiaries of Blackstone Group 
LP. The real estate portfolio of Fidere, initially consisting of the social housing units 
stemming from the 2013 privatisations, has in the meantime risen to approximately 
6,500 housing, 96% of which are located in the Madrid metropolitan region. 
Step 2  ? asset purchases from SAREB. Initiating in 2014, direct purchases of differ-
ent real estate portfolios from the SAREB were carried out, with a strong geograph-
ical focus on the metropolitan areas of Madrid and Barcelona. More specifically, 
Blackstone acquired the Dorian portfolio consisting of 620 socially protected hous-
ing units8 along with 1,200 garages and storage facilities (43.7 ŵŝůůŝŽŶ  ? ?. Late in 
                                                          
6 In Spanish: Empresa Municipal de Vivienda y Suelo, EMVS. 
7 In Spanish: Instituto de la Vivienda de Madrid, IVIMA.  
8 So ĐĂůůĞĚ “sŝǀŝĞŶĚĂĚĞWƌŽƚĞĐĐŝſŶKĨŝĐŝĂů ? ?ŽƌsWK, which consists of a publicly subsidised scheme 
allowing lower-middle income households to purchase properties. 
2014, it bought the Aneto portfolio consisting of 39 NPL valued at 237 ŵŝůůŝŽŶ  ?, 
backed by 29 property developments and land ready for construction, located 
mainly in Madrid. Additionally, Blackstone paid an estimated 81.3 milůŝŽŶ ?for the 
FAB Corona with four office buildings in Madrid.  
Step 3  ? asset purchases from savings banks. Between 2014 and 2015, Blackstone 
significantly advanced its position purchasing assets from the state-rescued savings 
banks. For instance, for  ? ? ŵŝůůŝŽŶ  ? ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶsocially protected housing 
units (VPO) were obtained from the Madrid based Bankia institution. But the most 
important transaction was the purchase of the NPL portfolio from Catalunya Banc  W
which merged out of three heavily indebted Catalan savings banks- with a discount 
of almost 40% of the ƉŽƌƚĨŽůŝŽ ?ƐďŽŽŬvalue. The operation transferred the  ‘toxic ? 
portfolio of more than 40,000 NPL ĨŽƌĂƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůďŽŽŬǀĂůƵĞŽĨ ? ? ? ? ?ďŝůůŝŽŶ ? to 
the Fund for Securitisation of Assets (FTA 2015). Blackstone participated in the FTA 
2015 with 3.615 billion  ? ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐĂǁĂƌĚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ&ZK ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƉƌŽĨ ?
its and losses of this joint venture have been unevenly shared: any mortgage de-
faults principally affect the FROB, while profits have been shared equally. This 
transaction inaugurated the brand name of the servicer Anticipa Real Estate, re-
sponsible for the management and administration of the NPLs originally belonging 
to Catalunya Banc. Blackstone has further continued to acquire NPL portfolios from 
different entities merging them under the umbrella of the Anticipa Real Estate, for 
a total value of approximately another 3 bŝůůŝŽŶ  ? ?Stemming from the resulting 
foreclosures of the acquired NPL, Anticipa Real Estate has now built up a portfolio 
of 12,000 properties that are mainly rented out. 
Step 4  ? further creation of REITs out of purchased assets. Beyond the REIT Fidere, 
Blackstone has created three other REITs, which are managed by Anticipa Real Es-
tate. The REITs Albirana Properties, Pegarena and Tourmalet account for more than 
10,000 rental housing units and allow Blackstone to maximise benefits from the tax 
exemptions granted for REITs. Following an asset restructuration, the REIT Tour-
malet was integrated in 2017 into the portfolio of Fidere.  
Step 5  ? real estate portfolio purchase from Banco Popular: Pursuing further re-
structuring of the banking sector, the largest Spanish bank Banco Santander ab-
sorbed by mid-2017 in an emergency acquisition the Banco Popular, which was fac-
ing bankruptcy. This transaction motivated Blackstone to negotiate the purchase of 
a majority stake of 51% of the real estate portfolio of Banco Popular, which in-
cludes housing, commercial premises, land and mortgages of an initial gross book 
ǀĂůƵĞŽĨ  ? ?ďŝůůŝŽŶ ? ? Various technical adjustments reduced the book value to 10 
ďŝůůŝŽŶ ?, allowing Blackstone ďǇƌĞŝŵďƵƌƐŝŶŐ ? ? ?ďŝůůŝŽŶ ?ŽďƚĂŝŶing the operational 
control over the servicer Aliseda managing these assets. The assets have then been 
transferred to the fund Quasar -legally constituted in Caiman Islands- owned at 
51% by Blackstone Real Estate Partners Europe V and at 49% by Banco Santander. 
Step 6  ? Hotel investments. The purchase of the real estate portfolio from Banco 
Popular ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ŚŽƚĞů ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǀĂůƵĞĚ Ăƚ ĂƌŽƵŶĚ  ? ? ? ŵŝůůŝŽŶ  ? ?offering 
Blackstone access to another market segment. Shortly after, in October 2017, Hal-
ley Holdco, which is controlled by subsidiaries of Blackstone, purchased the hotel 
management platform HI Partners from the Spanish Banco Sabadell in a 630.73 mil-
lion  ? transaction. This portfolio comprises 14 large hotels with approximately 
3,700 rooms located mainly in Madrid and in Mediterranean coastal destinations. 
During spring 2018, Blackstone lost a bidding competition against the Thai invest-
ment fund Minor to control the NH hotel group. But shortly after this, its Luxem-
bourg-based subsidiary Alzette launched successfully a takeover bid of 90.55 % of 
the REIT Hispania at a price of 2.62 ďŝůůŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚŝŶ:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ?. This 
transaction allowed Blackstone to become the first hotel operator in Spain with 
more than 20,000 bedrooms, alongside with gaining control over the management 
of another 650 flats and 180,000 square metres of office space. 
Step 7  ? further asset diversification. During 2018, Blackstone further diversified its 
investment strategy by pursuing several acquisitions. For instance, 120 million  ?
were spent for the purchase of 344,000 square metres of logistics and industrial 
warehouses and land for developing such uses from the REIT Lar España, located in 
the outskirts of Madrid and Valencia. The fund invested also  ?ďŝůůŝŽŶ ?ƚŽacquire 
Cirsa, a company operating from its headquarter in Spain 155 casinos, 68 bingos, 
40,000 slot machines, 2,500 premises offering sports betting services, 3,200 lottery 
premises, and online gaming sites in more than 70 countries. In September 2018 
Blackstone used its branch Tropic Real Estate Holding LLC for the purchase of a 
50.1% share of the REIT Testa Residencial. With an ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚŽĨ  ? ? ?ŵŝůůŝŽŶ ?, it 
gained operative control over an additional 10,600 rental housing units located 
mainly in Madrid. 
 
Table 1: A timeline of Blackstone investing in Spanish real estate 
Year  Acquisition 
2013 Social housing units from Madrid´s Municipal Housing Company EMVS 
2014 
Socially protected housing -VPO- and Non-Performing Loans -NPL- (Dorian & Aneto 
portfolios), offices (FAB Corona) from SAREB 
 
2015 
VPO and NPL from savings banks (Bankia, Catalunya Banc) and different private 
banks, merging into the management company Anticipa Real Estate 
2016-17 
 
Asset restructuring: Creation of new REITs out of assets managed by Anticipa Real 
Estate: Albirana, Pegarena, Tourmalet 
2017 
 
Different asset classes out of bankruptcy estates from Banco Popular, operational 
control over the management company Aliseda 
2017-18 Hotels from Banco Sabadell and REIT Hispania 
2018 Industrial warehouses and industrial land from Lar España  
2018 Gaming and gambling assets (Casinos, Bingos, slot machines etc.) from Cirsa 
2018 Rental housing from Testa Residencial 
2019 
 
Start of the process to disinvest: Tenders to sell land for real estate developments 
 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
dŚĞƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨůĂĐŬƐƚŽŶĞ ?ƐŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĞƐǁŝĨƚĂŶĚ
deep transformation that the Spanish real estate market has undergone by opening 
up to transnational private equity firms. The novel policies and management struc-
tures arising from the disinvestment of mortgages and properties allowed Black-
stone alongside with other international firms to evolve within only a five years ?ƚŝŵĞ 
as chief players in a rapidly changing environment. The Spanish market represents 
now one fifth ŽĨůĂĐŬƐƚŽŶĞ ?ƐǁŽƌůĚǁŝĚĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚŝŶƌĞĂůĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ůĂĐŬƐƚŽŶĞĂůŽŶĞ
ĞǆĞĐƵƚĞĚŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ  ? ?ďŝůůŝŽŶ  ?ŽĨ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ŝŶƚŽƉ^ĂŶŝƐŚƌĞĂůĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ĂŶĚĂůŽŶŐ ?
side with additional two-ĚŝŐŝƚ ďŝůůŝŽŶ  ? ŝŶǀĞsted by other private equity firms, the 
structure of the Spanish real estate market has been literally been turned upside 
down. But the first tender to sell land ready for real estate development as an-
nounced by Blackstone in October 2018 demonstrates that the moment for disin-
vestments may be approaching rapidly, with uncertain consequences. However, in 
the meantime it is important to better grasp the economic, social and spatial conse-
quences of the described restructuring in ƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐĐĂƉŝƚĂů Madrid. This question 
will be addressed in the following section, by shifting attention to the social and spa-
tial links and the financial chains that connect ůĂĐŬƐƚŽŶĞ ?ƐŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚs with the res-
idents in the Carabanchel neighbourhood in the south-western periphery of Madrid, 
location of the former social housing stock privatised to Fidere. 
 
4. The collaterals of reinvented real estate markets  ? insights from Madrid ?Ɛ ƉĞ ?
riphery 
With the outbreak of the economic crisis a decade ago, more than one million repos-
sessed assets including mortgaged houses, semi-built spaces, garages, land and oth-
ers had been piling up in the spreadsheets of the Spanish banks. Following the 
agreements of the 2012 bank rescue and the changing equity capital rules imple-
mented under the Basel III post-crisis regulatory reforms for the European banking 
sector, most real estate assets shall be disinvested by latest at the end of 2019. This 
imperative has significantly influenced privatisation policies of the SAREB but also 
disinvestment strategies of most banks, generating amongst others a remarkable 
increase of the REITs and the perpetual activity of the servicers in Spanish real es-
tate. As analysed in the previous section, transnational equity firms and hedge funds 
now hold the ownership of numerous assets and manage securitised mortgages and 
NPL portfolios, with Blackstone being the most prominent investor in the country. 
And since government policies were heavily boosting the lease of properties, most 
assets have now become part of the rental market, with the market share of renting 
having doubled within a decade. 
At the same time, the conditions in the residential real estate market have dramati-
cally shifted. For instance, in Madrid, the 2008-2013 economic crisis triggered a de-
cline of the average housing prices of about one third; falling approximately 25% in 
the most affluent neighbourhoods and more than 50% in the poorest districts9. 
Rents also dropped between 18 and 35%, with the strongest decreases occurring in 
less affluent neighbourhoods. Since then economic recovery going hand in hand with 
the financialisation and liberalisation of the real estate market has prompted dra-
matic increases. Nevertheless, the upswing of property prices is highly selective 
across the city, with the upper market range exceeding by 20% the pre-crisis peaks, 
while less affluent neighbourhoods still have prices nearly 40% cheaper than a dec-
ade ago. This geographically uneven boom exemplifies the rising polarisation and 
inequalities in the Spanish society, with lower-income households suffering from 
squeezing incomes and the tightening of mortgage access. The price gaps have been 
exploited in affluent neighbourhoods for the last five years, while poorer areas have 
only started to gain track during 2017-18.  
However, the most striking changes are related to the rental market which has be-
come the main focus of capital accumulation. Since 2014, rents in the city went up 
on average by 47%, exceeding the pre-crisis levels now by 19%. This situation has 
been appealed by social movements and mainstream media as a new housing crisis. 
The increase has been relatively similar in all districts, covering a range of between 
40 and 59%. Interesting enough is that the steepest rise has been witnessed in the 
city centre, which experiences strong rent pressures due to the competition of resi-
dential rents with tourism and other short-term rentals providing significantly higher 
income. On the other hand, rent increases have also been extraordinarily high in 
several peripheral neighbourhoods, with the working class districts of Vallecas and 
Carabanchel ranking immediately after the city centre. Both areas were part of the 
municipal urban expansion schemes designed in the late 1990s to accommodate 
about 75,000 inhabitants, mainly from lower and lower-middle class economic back-
grounds. In both areas, the municipal and regional housing companies EMVS and 
IVIMA built a significant stock of social housing which however was entirely sold to 
Blackstone and Goldman Sachs in 2013 (see Figure 1).  
 
  
                                                          
9 All values considered in this section have been processed and calculated from raw data published by 
Idealista, which is the largest Spanish online real estate platform. Idealista provides detailed overview 
about prices in the real estate market on an aggregate and detailed level, with the latest data stem-
ming from 30 September 2018. Raw data is available at: https://www.idealista.com/informes-precio-
vivienda. 
Figure 1: Spatial distribution of privatised social housing units in the municipality 
and the metropolitan region of Madrid. 
 
Source: Own elaboration and data compilation. 
 
The previous analysis may suggest a possible correlation between market perfor-
mance and private equity investment in DĂĚƌŝĚ ?Ɛperipheral working class neigh-
bourhoods. This is why we will subsequently focus on an in-depth exploration how 
finance connects with and affects the daily living conditions in specific places by fo-
cusing on the Carabanchel neighbourhood. As indicated by the CEO of the Goldman 
Sachs subsidiary Azora,  ‘the real business is now in the periphery; that is, renting to 
households that are not granted mortgages by any bank ? (citation translated from 
Gabarre & Martínez, 2018). In this regard, the profitability of the social housing units 
acquired from the municipal housing corporation in Carabanchel (see Figure 2 for a 
spatial overview of the neighbourhood) may indicate us how rent gaps have been 
strategically exploited by the investor. Between 2014, the first full year of manage-
ment by Fidere, and 2017 rental turnover from the seven purchased blocks in this 
neighbourhood grew by 38%, i.e. ĨƌŽŵ ? ? ? ?ƚŽ  ? ? ? ?ŵŝůůŝŽŶ  ? ? However, prices vary 
strongly between different blocks and years. While only in 2017 average rents grew 
by 12.2%, rent increases of 34% were achieved in one of the seven blocks (Fidere, 
2018). This corresponds to the variety of contractual situations that tenants inherit-
ed from the former social housing stock and that have been gradually adapted to 
market rates. At the same time, our own research confirms average price increases 
for new lettings of more than 50 percent only in the last two years. 
 
Figure 2: The location of privatised social housing blocks in Carabanchel Bajo. 
 
Source: Own elaboration and data compilation. 
 
Beyond initial endorsements by local and regional authorities that the transfer of 
ownership to the private equity firms would not affect the housing status of the ex-
isting tenants, rent increases and discretional changes of contracts reshuffled the 
social profile. What is not however unveiled is the way how Blackstone managed to 
successfully exploit the indicated higher rents. Considering this, our research has 
identified six different strategies by which Fidere was aiming at maximising rents 
while attempting to change the social composition of tenants. This may offer valid 
insights about the broader consequences of financialisation of housing estates vis-a-
vis displacement and post-crisis urban transformations: 
Strategy 1  ? Displacement by abandonment. Soon after the change of ownership, 
tenants observed a significant decline in the building maintenance, letting them 
face on a daily basis with broken tiles, damaged windows, destroyed door locks and 
cracked lights. Common spaces such as courtyard gardens were also successively 
abandoned, hallways cleaning reduced, and commercial areas on the ground floors 
were emptied and walled with bricks. The atmosphere of abandonment created by 
the lack of maintenance had important effects, triggering a psychological setting 
pushing tenants out of their homes, proving the symbolic dimension of displace-
ment as a crucial element of socio-spatial restructuring.  
Strategy 2  ? Increases of utility costs. The change of ownership had nearly immedi-
ate effects on utility costs and other charges applied to tenants. For instance, new 
contracts with energy providers allocated substantial additional costs to house-
holds. Similarly, property taxes were now individually billed, as well as associated 
costs for garages and storage spaces previously included in the rents. These modifi-
cations affected especially the least affluent households unable to afford new 
costs, being consequently forced to move out. 
Strategy 3  ? Contractual uncertainty. Since the change of ownership implied the 
transfer of existing rent agreements from the public domain to private hands, con-
tracts were also subject to review. However, Fidere initially did not let tenants 
know what the practical implications of the ownership change would be, creating a 
long-standing uncertainty. For instance, changes in the criteria of how rent arrears 
would be practically handled or how public subsidies to rents would be managed 
aggravated the fragile position of tenants. And subsequently, the content and dura-
tion of contracts were modified, strictly applying the 2013 Urban Rent Law to in-
crease the benefits of the new owner. After several years, this strategy has now 
generalised contractual uncertainties amongst the tenants. As acknowledged in 
Fidere ?Ɛ 2017 annual results, more than 40% of all tenants have now contracts of 
duration of less than one year. 
Strategy 4  ? Atomisation and individualisation. Furthermore, many tenants experi-
enced also individualised strategies of pressure in manifold ways. Soon after the 
ƐĂůĞ ? Ă ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐ ? ƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵ ƚŽ ƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ ƐƉĞĐƵůĂƚŝǀĞ ƌĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
their homes into financial assets surged. Especially those who mobilised in the 
neighbourhood assembly created to negotiate collectively with the fund were tar-
geted by the new owner. For instance, rumours were spread that assembly mem-
bers ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĞǆĐůƵĚĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ŵƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ǁĂŝƚŝŶŐ ůŝƐƚƐ ĨŽƌ ƐŽĐŝĂů ŚŽƵƐŝŶŐ if 
they did not accept the new contractual conditions applied by Fidere. This threat 
affected especially households who were considering applying for social housing 
again. Other actions implied social workers employed by the company to pressure 
neighbours individually on renegotiating the contracts. In this regard, intimidations 
raised further sentiments of fear and feeling literally out of place. Fear and anxiety 
as micro-political strategies were moreover pursued by the continuous rumours on 
changes in contract details, constant discussions about possible rent increases, the 
proliferation of added costs and incessant pressures to adjust to new norms ap-
plied by the private equity firm. The raised housing insecurity proved eventually an 
efficient means of an individualised psychological control capable to suppress col-
lective action against the fund, but indirectly also inciting displacement. As a con-
sequence, protests against the ĨƵŶĚ ?Ɛmanagement strategy proved ineffective. 
Strategy 5  ? Selected evictions. Selective evictions were also affecting the social 
composition of tenants in two diverging manners. On the one hand, selective evic-
tion relates to population in precarious economic conditions. For instance, house-
holds with economic deficiencies and in rental arrears were the first ones to be di-
rectly displaced. When facing substantial rent increases, many households were 
forced to seek alternative housing options, either applying back for social housing 
or occupying empty houses elsewhere in the same or other neighbourhoods. On 
the other hand, selective eviction has proved to be also a meaningful way to pres-
sure residents who actively engaged in collective action. Several assembly mem-
bers were not offered new contracts and asked to move out, with the spokesper-
son of the neighbourhood assembly being the most prominent target. 
Strategy 6  ? Tenant replacement through the renegotiation of contracts. Finally, a 
key strategy consisted of seeking tenant replacement whenever contracts expired. 
Eventually rent increases equalised the rents to the market average. Taking into 
consideration that many households were rather underprivileged tenants, often 
unemployed and on minimum wage or supported by state transfers, the applied 
rent increases immediately made them leave their homes and move elsewhere. On 
the other hand, those who could afford the new rents alternatively also began to 
seek other privately rented housing certifying better conditions. This kind of dis-
placement eventually eroded spatial as well as social relations that had evolved 
over time. Distrust became accompanied by an abstract belief shared by previous 
social tenants that they would eventually also be displaced and that more affluent 
households will become the only residents of the reinvented housing stock. While 
some residents with more stable working conditions managed to renegotiate their 
contracts and maintain their homes, others simply put up with rent and the living 
cost increases. At the same time, younger and more prosperous tenants appear to 
have replaced those directly displaced.  
The ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌ ?Ɛstrategies and the immediate consequences upon the 
social and spatial configuration of the neighbourhood may trigger a discussion about 
how the social costs of the privatisation of municipally owned housing have been 
allocated. For instance, many households who have been eventually displaced from 
their home are still eligible to apply for social housing, similarly to many of those 
who managed to cope with rent increases. However, the radically diminished social 
housing stock in the city means that even though they have directed themselves 
back to the social services, the chances to be reallocated to public housing estates 
are low. More than 24,000 households with approved claims for social housing are in 
Madrid on ever increasing waiting lists, against a fully occupied social housing stock 
of only 7,500 units. In other words, the social consequences of the displacement 
originated by the privatisation of social housing have been externalised to the public 
sector, instigating a seesaw between the economic transactions and social implica-
tions related to housing financialisation and privatisation. There is clear evidence 
that the new investor is able to generate profits and surpluses from rent increases 
and displacements without any further investment to upgrade flats, while social con-
sequences remain to be addressed in the public sphere. The outsourcing of negative 
effects is either directly expressed by the recent demand for social housing, indirect-
ly indicated by the pressure for explicit use of welfare services or tacitly demonstrat-
ed by rising levels of deprivation and the related social and spatial conflicts that con-
tour the origins of a new housing crisis.  
 
5. Socio-spatial logics of transnational real estate investment  ? a discussion 
Evidence from transnational real estate investment in Spain clearly demonstrates 
how post-crisis market recovery has been intrinsically linked to public policies elevat-
ing the profitability of real estate. More precisely, the financialisation of housing in 
Madrid picturesquely illustrates the manifold manners by which global capital was 
facilitated to reshuffle national and local real estate markets. For instance, debt 
management and crisis policies established pathways generating more liquidity, 
mainly served through novel financial schemes and rounds of privatisations. Finan-
cial restructuring allowed new actors such as private equity firms to exploit assets 
through REITs and servicers; buoyed by legislative amendments that gave decisive 
impetus to the extraction of surplus values from space in the form of rent. Eventual-
ly, transnational investors such as Blackstone have been establishing fresh channels 
of value transfer between people, places and financial institutions.  
From another perspective, this transfer of value also illustrates the way debt is re-
vised as financial mechanism and how debt relations shape the concurrent social and 
spatial conditions. The pre-crisis accumulation cycle was primarily focusing on the 
expansion of debt, for example in the form of mortgages and mortgaged homeown-
ership, normalising financial exploitation of most social strata. Contrary to this, the 
post-crisis accumulation cycle has been concentrating on establishing novel mecha-
nisms of extraction, especially in the form of rents. While debt may still maintain the 
value transfer between people, markets, institutions and places, it is moreover en-
dowed to expand into new practices that intensify wealth and income redistribution 
sustaining and deepening economic and social inequalities as well as spatial segrega-
tion. With mortgages being more strictly regulated in scope and extent, a significant-
ly bigger share of households is left with scarce housing alternatives. Simultaneously, 
the rental market has become increasingly structured by business practices of finan-
cial investors that have accumulated sufficient market power to raise rents and gen-
erate higher profits. Our research has demonstrated that unlike individual owners 
and locally rooted companies and banks, the global financial actors do not include 
personal ties or social relations in negotiations, consenting more easily to violent 
spatial processes such as displacement in order to satisfy profit calculations. 
In this regard, our analysis has provided with clear insights into corresponding atti-
tudes as pursued by the private equity firm Blackstone affecting the social composi-
tion of privatised former social housing ĞƐƚĂƚĞƐ ŝŶ DĂĚƌŝĚ ?Ɛ ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ ?The faithful 
application of market rules has now become one of the prime mechanisms of private 
equity real estate management. Additionally, the quest for surplus values in the pe-
riphery of Madrid considers important rent increases as well as distinctive forms of 
displacements. And this practice is also assumed by other actors who have signifi-
cantly tightened up negotiation strategies with eviction procedures for non-
profitable tenants. By connecting the nodes of the financial chain between Black-
stone ?Ɛ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐand the residents of former social housing in the pe-
riphery of Madrid, our research has clearly demonstrated how the financialisation of 
public assets serves unequivocally the extraction of surpluses from emerging rent 
gaps.  
Moreover, by focusing on the newly constructed financial chains that connect local 
rental markets to transnational investors, the distinct dynamics of an emerging hous-
ing crisis may be better grasped. The exercise of economic control through rent in-
creases eventually evolves into control against tenant claims and mobilisations. This 
is also expressed in different forms of displacement, which may be conceived as a 
simultaneously spatial, economic, symbolic and psychological process that unveils 
the intrinsic violence of contemporary capitalism (Janoschka, 2018). Psychological 
distress and selective displacement of the most deprived and/or the politically ac-
tive, symbolic displacement due to declining living conditions and loss of social ties 
and economic displacement also demonstrate the harmful social consequences of 
privatised social housing stocks. The other side of the same coin is the extracted fi-
nancial profits that reflect the displacements of the vulnerable who then return to 
social services as supplicants for housing. 
Shrinking of social housing, restrictions in mortgages and persisting rent increases 
for those who are constrained to rent are pinpointing a new housing crisis that yet 
again was politically engineered. Rather than transforming the 2008-13 housing 
crackdown and the resulting bank rescues into a chance to expand the social func-
tion of housing, i.e. by transferring several hundreds of thousands of assets into a 
spatially dispersed and publicly owned and managed housing stock that protects 
vulnerable households from evictions and displacements, it was exclusively used to 
establish a base for the next speculative round of accumulation and dispossession. 
This comes as no surprise considering the symbiotic relationship between transna-
tional financial actors and politicians orchestrating the 2012 bank rescue and the 
subsequent policy restructuring in Spain10. The consequences of this have now 
reached the headlines of newspapers: Households unable to keep up with increasing 
rents in central areas move to peripheral locations, such as Carabanchel, triggering 
chain effects of displacement; while former social tenants displaced by transnational 
investors seek housing in the further periphery. Local governments (at least in Ma-
drid and Barcelona), ŚŽƵƐŝŶŐĂĐƚŝǀŝƐƚƐĂŶĚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ ?ƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŽƌǇƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵƐunderline 
the emergence of this new housing crisis by calling for better monitoring of financial 
practices. However, whether these voices are heard and negotiated becomes anoth-
er research question. Conceivably future research may shed light on the conflictive 
                                                          
10 For instance, the Ministry of Economy of the Spanish government was hold from 2011-2018 by the 
same person that had acted as the regional director for Spain and Portugal of the infamous invest-
ment bank Lehman Brothers until it ceased its activities during the global financial crisis. 
character of this socio-spatial restructuring that financial chains provoke as well as 
on the way housing may be reinvented by those affected from exclusionary govern-
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